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Abstract
Halpern and Hitchcock (2014) have used normality considerations in or-
der to provide an analysis of actual causation. Their methodology is that of
taking a set of causal scenarios and showing how their account of actual cau-
sation accords with typical judgments about those scenarios. Consequently,
Halpern and Hitchcock have recently demonstrated that their theory deals
with an impressive number of traditional problem cases discussed in the lit-
erature. However, in this paper I first show that the way in which Halpern
and Hitchcock rule out certain cases of bogus prevention leaves their account
susceptible to counterexamples. I then analyze those counterexamples in the
light of the observation that, in addition to abnormal causes, people naturally
focus on abnormal effects. I then argue that this bias towards abnormal ef-
fects has resulted in accounts of actual causation that cannot deal with causal
scenarios in which the actual effect is normal.
1 Introduction
Following Hart and Honoré’s seminal (1985) work, there have been several recent
attempts to account for folk intuitions about actual causes in terms of normality (cf.
Kahneman and Miller 1986, Menzies 2007, Hall 2007, Hitchcock 2007, Halpern and
Hitchcock 2014). The methodology in these discussions has been that of taking a
set of causal scenarios and trying to provide an account of actual causation that
would agree with folk judgments about those cases. Legitimate worries can be
raised as to the usefulness of that approach (cf. Glymour et al 2010, Danks 2013).
But in this essay I want to put those objections to one side and discuss some causal
scenarios that the normality-based accounts still don’t get right. Specifically, I will
focus on the recent account provided by Halpern and Hitchcock (2013; 2014), which
is the most sophisticated normality-based treatment of actual causation to date.
The very basic idea in normality-based accounts has been this: out of the causally
relevant factors in any given situation, ordinary speakers tend to assign a stronger
causal status to those that are unexpected and abnormal. Thus, for example,
if we are more likely to say that the occurrence of a forest fire is the result of
someone’s lighting a match rather than the result of there being oxygen present in
the atmosphere–even though both factors are counterfactual difference-makers for
the fire–it is because someone’s lighting a match is an abnormal event whereas there
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being oxygen present in the atmosphere is very normal indeed. Observations such
as these have led many philosophers and psychologists to argue that actual causes
are always exceptional events, or, as I’ll often say, abnormal values of variables.
My main argument is that such accounts of actual causation suffer from ‘abnor-
mality bias’. True, in most cases, when we explain something causally, to ourselves
or others, we are focusing on abnormal events. Why did the forest fire? Why did
someone become pregnant? Why did that same person develop thrombosis? Why
did the chief executive die? And so on. This bias is perfectly understandable because
it is pragmatically important to be able to predict and control such occurrences.
They provoke our natural curiosity. But such narrow focus is harmful if our goal is
to give a general account of actual causation. Even if abnormal events are the most
interesting kinds of effect, it doesn’t follow that normal events do not have actual
causes. If you build your model of actual causation by focusing on abnormal effects,
there is a high risk that you cannot account for normal ones. I will demonstrate
that this is exactly what has happened: Halpern and Hitchcock as well as the other
advocates of normality-based accounts have only managed to give an account of
the actual causes of abnormal effects.
The structure of my paper is the following. Because my focus is on Halpern and
Hitchcock’s sophisticated theory, I start by introducing the Halpern-Pearl formalism
for actual causes that they use, which has been presented in various places over
the last ten years (cf. Halpern and Hitchcock 2010, 2014; Halpern and Pearl 2005;
Halpern 2013). This is what I will do in the next section. After that, in the following
section, I will proceed to discuss several examples that Halpern and Hitchcock’s
account do and do not get right. In particular I will argue that their account still
doesn’t get certain prevention scenarios right. The reason for this is that those
are exactly the kinds of cases in which the value of the effect variable is normal.
This is demonstrated with examples. Because my thesis will not be fully established
until I have said more about how the normality of the value of an effect variable is
determined, I close my paper with a discussion on this issue. In doing so, I will draw
on Tim Maudlin’s (2007) ideas on causal systems obeying quasi-Newtonian laws.
2 The Halpern-Pearl Formalism
We start with a causal model M, which is a tuple (U, V, E), where U is a set of
exogenous variables, V is a set of endogenous variables, and E is a set of structural
equations relating the values of the variables. M is usually assumed to be acyclic,
which intuitively means that there are no feedback loops in the model, and more
formally that there is some total ordering≺ such that, if X ≺ Y, then the value of
X can affect the value of Y but not vice versa.
In the definition of actual causation below, φ denotes a Boolean combination
of ‘primitive events’ of the form X = x where X ∈ V and x is among the possible
values of X. Setting the value of X in this way results in a new causal model which
is otherwise identical to M except that the structural equation for X is replaced with
X = x. The abbreviation [~Y ←~y ] denotes the case in which variables Y1,..., Yk
∈ V are set to some of their possible values. [~Y ←~y ]φ states that φ holds if Yi
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were to be set to values yi for i = 1, ..., k. Such a ‘causal formula’, abbreviated ψ,
requires some context ~u. The fact that some causal formula holds in some causal
model and context can then be expressed as (M, ~u) |= ψ. For a more technical
exposition, see any of the papers by Halpern cited in the introduction.
We can now state the Halpern-Pearl definition of actual causation (quoted from
Halpern 2013, p.3 with inconsequential changes in notation and original italics):
~X= ~x is an actual cause of φ in (M, ~u) if the following three conditions
hold:
AC1. (M, ~u) |= ( ~X = ~x) and (M, ~u) |= φ
AC2. There is a partition of V (the set of endogenous variables) into
two subsets ~Z and ~W with ~X ⊆ ~Z and a setting ~x′ and ~w of the
variables in ~X and ~W , respectively, such that if (M, ~u) |= Z = z* for
all Z ∈ ~Z , then both of the following conditions hold:
(a) (M, ~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x′, ~W ← ~w]∼ φ
(b) (M, ~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x; ~W ′ ← ~w; ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]φ for all subsets ~W ′ of ~W
and all subsets ~Z ′ of ~Z, where I abuse notation and write ~W ′ ←~w to
denote the assignment where the variables in ~W ′ get the same values
as they would in the assignment ~W ← ~w.
AC3. ~X is minimal; no subset of ~X satisfies conditions AC1 and AC2.
The tuple ( ~W, ~w, ~x′) is said to be a witness to the fact that ~X = ~x is
a cause of φ.
Condition AC1 requires that ~X = ~x and φ actually be the case. This is very
reasonable, given that we are here trying to give an account of actual causation.
Condition AC3 is the familiar requirement that the cause shouldn’t involve elements
that are redundant with respect to the effect.
Condition AC2a states that changing the value of ~X to some value ~x′ 6=~x makes
it the case that ∼ φ. This betrays the fact that the account of causation in play is
counterfactual. However, it needn’t be the case that setting the value of ~X to ~x′
invariably results in ∼ φ. Rather, we have the partition of the endogenous variables
into two sets ~Z and ~W such that ~X is a subset of the set of variables ~Z. Setting the
value of ~X to ~x′ need only result in ∼ φ under the contingency that the variables
in ~W are fixed to some values ~w. This captures the commonsensical idea that a
causal dependency between two or more variables sometimes becomes ‘visible’ just
in the case some ‘off-path’ variables in the causal model are kept fixed.
Condition AC2b imposes some constraints on the variables in the two sets. The
requirement is that φ holds if we set ~X to ~x and some subset of the variables in ~W
get the same values as they would in ~W ← ~w and some subset of the variables in ~Z
get the same values as they do in the actual world. The point of this requirement
is to ensure that even if fixing the values of the variables in ~W ′ changes the values
of the variables in ~Z, this change is not what makes it the case that φ when ~X =
~x. To capture this, the relationship between ~X = ~x and φ is required to hold even
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when a subset of the variables in ~Z are set in their actual values, i.e. the values
implied by (M, ~u).
The ‘witness’ for the causal relation between ~X = ~x and φ is the setting of
variables in the relevant model that we consult in order to reveal the counterfactual
dependency between the two. Importantly, such witnesses can be ranked in terms
of their normality. Halpern and Hitchcock (2014) utilize a partial preorder  to do
so. This relation is transitive and reflexive but not total.
Take two ‘small worlds’ s and s’, which are complete specifications of the en-
dogenous variables in a causal model. If s is strictly more normal than s’, then
Halpern and Hitchcock write s  s’. If s  s’ and s’  s, then they write s ≡ s’.
In order for s and s’ to be comparable, there must be some nonempty set ~X of
variables that take more typical values in one of the worlds and less typical values
in the other. However, if it is the case that there are two sets of variables ~X and ~Y
such that the variables in ~X take more typical values in one of the worlds but the
variables in ~Y take more typical values in the other, then s and s’ are incomparable.
This is what is meant by saying that  is not total.
Let s~u denote the actual small world and s ~w,~x′,~u the world in which ~W is set
to ~w, ~X is set to ~x and the context is ~u. Then Halpern and Hitchcock require
that, in order for ~X = ~x to be an actual cause of φ, conditions AC1 thru AC3
must be satisfied, and additionally in AC2a it must be the case that s ~w,~x′,~u s~u.
In other words, the small world that is the witness for the causal relation between
~X = ~x and φ must be strictly more normal than the actual world. If there are
many such witnesses, it is possible to order them according to their normality. The
‘best witness’ for ~X = ~x being a cause of φ is the one that is the most normal.
Halpern and Hitchcock conjecture that, in situations where there are multiple causes
for some φ, people tend to pick out those that have the best witnesses. In what
follows, whenever I talk about witnesses, I talk about small witness worlds.
What is the point of this normality ranking? Philosophers and psychologists
have demonstrated that conceptions about what is normal play an important role in
causal judgments (cf. Menzies 2007; Hart and Honoré 1985; Hitchcock and Knobe
2009; Kahneman and Miller 1986). Utilizing normality considerations together with
their accounts of actual causation, philosophers have in recent years claimed to be
able to explain the intuitions that ordinary speakers have about old causal chestnuts
such as Prevention, Double Prevention, Bogus Prevention, Pre-emption, Omission,
Selection, Switching, Emphasis, Transitivity and Thrombosis. Some of these are
cases with which simple counterfactual accounts of causation struggle because the
counterfactual relationship between two variables is usually masked in one way or
another. This is why we need to consider a contingency–a setting of the off-path
variables in our model–that reveals those masked counterfactual relationships. This
is what definitions of actual causation such as the H-P account described above
deliver. But even that isn’t enough: we are still left with some cases where those
accounts of actual causation give the intuitively wrong result. These are the cases,
finally, that we hope to be able to get right by adding the normality ranking into
our theory of actual causation.
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3 Examples
In this section, I will discuss some causal scenarios with which Halpern and Hitch-
cock’s normality-based account struggles. I want to emphasize that there are also
several cases, which I have no space to discuss, that their account handles elegantly
(for which see Halpern and Hitchcock 2014). What is common between those cases
is that the actual value of the effect variable is abnormal. That is why Halpern and
Hitchcock’s account manages to pick out those effects’ intuitively correct, abnormal
actual causes. Conversely, the problematic examples that I will discuss in this sec-
tion have the common feature that the value of the effect variable is normal. But,
so as not to skip ahead, let me explain how Halpern and Hitchcock’s account works
by discussing the following perfectly ordinary, unproblematic case of pre-emption:
Example 1. Suzy and Bill, both competent rock throwers, are de-
termined to destroy a nearby glass bottle. Suzy throws a rock that
hits the bottle and the bottle shatters. Had Suzy not thrown her rock,
Bill would have thrown his, in which case the bottle would also have
shattered.
Let us model the case with the following variables:
ST = 1 if Suzy throws, 0 otherwise
BT = 1 if Bill throws, 0 otherwise
BS = 1 if the bottle shatters, 0 otherwise
With these variables at hand, we can observe that the following equations capture
the causal structure of the situation:
ST = 1
BT = 1 - ST
BS = max (ST, BT)
The H-P definition of actual causation yields the correct result with ~Z = {ST, BS},
~W = {BT} and the value of the variable in ~W set to 0. The witness for the causal
relation between the values of ST and BS is the small world (ST = 0, BT = 0,
BS = 0). This is the contingency that we need to consider in order to unmask the
counterfactual relationship between ST = 1 and BS = 1. Because that relationship
is revealed only when we consider a contingency, it is easy to see that we cannot
naively require that the counterfactual relationship between the values of ST and
BS must be visible under all conditions in order for there to be causation between
them. Finally, note that the contingency that we consider in order to unmask the
relationship, namely (ST = 0, BT = 0, BS = 0), is intuitively more normal than
the actual world (ST = 1, BT = 0, BS = 1) is. Thus, ST = 1 counts as an actual
cause of BS = 1 under Halpern and Hitchcock’s account. This is to be expected,
given that the actual value of the effect variable in this causal scenario is abnormal.
Moving on to more challenging examples, let us consider a case of bogus pre-
vention:
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Example 2. Assassin plans to put a lethal dose of poison in Victim’s
coffee. At the very last moment, she changes her mind and refrains.
Bodyguard puts effective antidote in the coffee. Victim drinks the coffee
and survives.
Here we can use the following variables:
A = (1 if Assassin puts in poison, 0 if she doesn’t)
B = (1 if Bodyguard puts in antidote, 0 if she doesn’t)
VS = (1 if Victim survives, 0 if she doesn’t)
We need just one equation to capture the causal structure (or so I claim):
VS = max((1-A), B)
Without normality considerations, the H-P definition counts B = 1 as a cause of
VS = 1 in the actual world where A = 0. For if we partition the variables into ~W =
{A} and ~Z = {B, VS}, set A = 1 and switch B = 0, we end up with VS = 0. AC2b
doesn’t help because the members of ~Z - ~X consist of {} and VS. But observe now
that the world s ~w,~x′,~u is (A = 1, B = 0, VS = 0) while the world s~u is (A = 0, B
= 1, VS = 1). Assuming that the normal values for the cause variables here are
A = 0 and B = 0, we can now observe that the two worlds are, for Halpern and
Hitchcock, incomparable. There is a singleton set {A} with a more normal value in
s~u; and there is the singleton set {B} with a more normal value in s ~w,~x′,~u. Given
Halpern and Hitchcock’s requirement that s ~w,~x′,~u should be strictly more normal
than s~u, B = 1 does not count as a cause of VS = 1, just as required.
Let me here mark an ambiguity in Halpern and Hitchcock’s account. For it
is not clear whether one should incorporate the value of the effect variable in the
normality comparison. Certainly, when Halpern and Hitchcock (2014) discuss the
several examples that they are able to sort out with their account, they focus on
the normality of the cause variables. A world counts as more normal than another if
there is a non-empty set of variables that take more normal values in that world, and
no variables that take more normal values in the other world. Elsewhere (2013, p.
17–18) Halpern and Hitchcock suggest that the normal value of the effect variable
is determined by the values of the cause variables. If so, then the value of the effect
variable can be ignored in the comparison simply because it is always normal. I
agree that the normality of the value of the effect variable depends in some ways
on the values of the cause variables, although in my view there are causal scenarios,
such as prevention, in which it is nevertheless regarded as abnormal. I will return
to this in detail later.
Halpern and Hitchcock’s solution to bogus prevention seems worrying also be-
cause it is not quite clear how normality is relevant to the example. If you are like
me, you don’t tend to think that the two settings of variables–the actual setting
and its witness–are somehow impossible to compare. Instead of this alleged impos-
sibility of comparison, the real problem seems to be that B = 1 does not make any
difference to the causal system given its state before B taking that value. If Halpern
and Hitchcock’s account picks out the intuitively correct actual cause, this seems to
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be a matter of coincidence rather than a strongly rooted connection between their
account and the psychological mechanisms of the attribution of actual causation.
The above speculation suggests the following question: what if the overall con-
text in a causal scenario is changed in a way that renders the bogus preventer
comparably abnormal? As it turns out, it is not too difficult to invent such cases:
Example 3. Assassin has switched careers and is now a bartender.
Victim walks in the bar and orders a mojito. For some unknown reason,
Assassin refrains from putting in alcohol. Bodyguard puts in FSB’s
special alcohol neutralizer nevertheless. Victim drinks the mojito and
remains sober.
The variables could be:
A = (1 if Assassin puts in alcohol, 0 if she doesn’t)
B = (1 if Bodyguard puts in FSB’s special alcohol neutralizer, 0 if she
doesn’t)
VS = (1 if Victim remains sober, 0 if she doesn’t)
The equation describing the structure is:
VS = max((1-A), B)
The witness s ~w,~x′,~u for B = 1 being an actual cause of VS = 1 is (A = 1, B = 0, VS
= 0) and the actual small world s~u is (A = 0, B = 1, VS = 1). Intuitively, it is now
the case that s ~w,~x′,~u  s~u given that variables A and B take more normal values in
s ~w,~x′,~u.1 Thus, worlds s ~w,~x′,~u and s~u count as comparable and the witness s ~w,~x′,~u
is more normal than the actual world s~u. Therefore, B = 1 counts as an actual
cause of VS = 1 under Halpern and Hitchcock’s account. This is so even though it
seems clear that Bodyguard’s putting in alcohol neutralizer doesn’t play any role in
Victim’s remaining sober if there is no alcohol in Victim’s drink in the first place.
Similar scenarios are very easy to invent. This suggests that the incomparability
strategy is not the correct remedy to Example 2 either, but simply happens to
deliver the correct result in that case, perhaps as a side effect. Again, the real issue
seems to be that B = 1 just does not make any difference to the causal system
given its state before B’s occurrence. The problem with Halpern and Hitchcock’s
account is that it is not able to capture this feature of the causal scenario.
To conclude this section, I want to consider another case with which Halpern
and Hitchcock use the incomparability strategy:
Example 4. Hoping for a promotion, Bodyguard wants to make it
look as if she has successfully foiled a serious poisoning attempt. She
convinces Cooperative Assassin to put a lethal dose of poison in Victim’s
coffee, but only after she has first put in some antidote. This is exactly
what happens. Victim drinks the coffee and survives.
1For the purposes of this example, we can work with Halpern and Hitchcock’s (2013) assumption
that the normal value of the effect variable VS is the one determined by A and B according to
the relevant structural equation. In that case, the value of VS is normal in both worlds under
comparison and can be therefore ignored.
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We can use the following variables:
B = (1 if Bodyguard puts in antidote, 0 if she doesn’t)
C = (1 if Cooperative Assassin puts in poison, 0 if she doesn’t)
VS = (1 if Victim survives, 0 if she doesn’t)
The equations here are:
C = B
VS = max(B, (1-C))
B = 1 here seems to count as a cause of VS = 1 with the witness (B = 0, C = 1,
VS = 0). Halpern and Hitchcock write:
Suppose we decide that the typical value for both B and C is 0 and the
atypical value 1. This would seem prima facie reasonable This would
give us a normality ordering in which the witness (B = 0, C = 1, VS
= 0) is more normal than the actual world (B = 1, C = 1, VS = 1).
Intuitively, the value of B is more typical in the first world, and the value
of C is the same in both worlds, so the first world is more normal overall
than the second. If we reason this way, the modified theory still makes
B = 1 an actual cause of VS = 1. (Halpern and Hitchcock 2014, p.
39, with small changes in notation.)
They then go on to argue that the reasoning above involves a ‘subtle mistake’
because it doesn’t take into account the way in which the value of C depends
on the value of B, and how this affects the normality of C’s values. When this
dependence between C and B is recognized, it turns out that the way in which C
takes its values can be ranked as follows, where the normality is decreasing:
C = 0 (whatever the value of B)
C = B
C = 1 (whatever the value of B)
If this ranking is correct, Halpern and Hitchcock argue, it is no more the case that
the witness world (B = 0, C = 1, VS = 0) could be compared with the actual world
(B = 1, C = 1, VS = 1), because the dependence between the values of C and B is
more abnormal in the witness world than in the actual world. The conclusion that
Halpern and Hitchcock draw is that the two worlds are in fact incomparable and
thus that B = 1 does not count as an actual cause of VS = 1.
I want to make two observations here. The first one is that, as Halpern and
Hitchcock themselves point out, it is not obvious whether B = 1 should be an actual
cause of VS = 1 or not. It seems as if ordinary speakers can have different intuitions
about this scenario, depending on what they focus. In the next section, I’ll make
heavy use of this point. The second observation is that dealing with Example 4
in the suggested way naturally adds another degree of complexity to Halpern and
Hitchcock’s theory. Not only do we have to evaluate the normality of the values
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of variables, but now we also need to evaluate the normality of the relationships
between them. This claim is not in itself unreasonable, but we are definitely on
a slippery slope: as the number of factors affecting the normality of the values of
variables grows, one increasingly feels that the proposed account is unfalsifiable.
4 Normal Effects
Halpern and Hitchcock think that their account can be seen ‘as a formalization of
Kahneman and Miller’s (1986) observation that we tend to consider only possibilities
that result from altering atypical features of a world to make them more typical,
rather than vice versa’ (Halpern and Hitchcock 2014, p. 23–24). But a closer look
at Kahneman and Miller’s psychological theory makes it very clear that, for them,
those ‘atypical features’ include effects as well as causes:
Causal questions about particular events are generally raised only when
these events are abnormal. [...] A [causal] why question indicates that
a particular event is surprising and requests the explanation of an ef-
fect, defined as a contrast between an observation and a more normal
alternative. (Kahneman and Miller 1986, p. 148, original italics.)
So while Kahneman and Miller’s research seems to provide support for the idea
that people treat abnormal events as actual causes, it also suggests that the kinds
of events for which people provide causal explanations are abnormal. Then the
question is: what if the effect is not abnormal? The issue is relevant because
this seems to be the case in the problematic prevention cases discussed above.
Surviving, for example, can be thought of as a normal state for Victim to be, and
therefore it is not clear whether its actual causes have to be something abnormal,
any more than the actual causes of my getting to work at the usual time need to
be something abnormal. If I am late, the situation is different–at least if I am not
late regularly. Indeed, it seems that in those cases in which the effect is normal, we
regard its actual causes too as normal. This is so even if it is true, as Kahneman
and Miller suggest it is, that our causal why questions most of the time focus on
abnormal effects. That may reveal something interesting about human psychology,
but it doesn’t mean that normal effects don’t have actual causes. Consequently,
my working hypothesis will be that normal effects require normal causes.
If normal effects require normal causes, then it is not surprising that Halpern and
Hitchcock’s account delivers the wrong result when applied to cases in which the
actual value of the effect variable is normal. It delivers the wrong result because it
recognizes only abnormal values as candidate actual causes. This claim generalizes
to other similar accounts which are based on the assumption that actual causes are
always unexpected, surprising or abnormal.
If I would end the discussion here, I could be accused of trickery. For I have not
specified in any way what it is for the value of an effect variable to be normal. Of
course, it would be possible for me to reply that the normality of the value of an
effect variable is determined in the same way as the normality of the value of any
other variable in a causal model, and that therefore this is not a special problem
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to me but to everyone who appeals to normality rankings. But, as it happens,
it is possible to say something more interesting about the issue. Let us start by
considering the following example:
Example 5. A village gets regularly flooded in the spring, causing
minor damage in some of its medieval buildings. In earlier times, the
villagers have treated the floods and the resulting damage as inevitable
facts of life, but this spring they take precautionary measures and erect
some barriers along the river banks. As it happens, the spring is ex-
ceptionally dry and there are no floods. The medieval buildings remain
undamaged.
Take the following variables:
A = (1 if village gets flooded, 0 if it doesn’t)
B = (1 if barriers get erected, 0 if they don’t)
D = (1 if medieval buildings remain undamaged, 0 if they don’t)
Let us suppose that the causal structure of the situation is as follows:
D = max((1-A), B)
At first pass, this example looks like a problem to Halpern and Hitchcock and to
me. For Halpern and Hitchcock, it looks like a problem for all the familiar reasons.
B = 1 counts as an actual cause of D = 1 with the witness (A = 1, B = 0, D
= 0), which is more normal than the actual world (A = 0, B = 1, D = 1). B =
1’s being an actual cause of D = 0 is, of course, intuitively incorrect. Erecting the
barrier doesn’t make any difference in the causal system if there is no flood in the
first place. Note, however, that the occurrence of minor damage to the village’s
medieval buildings, i.e. D = 1, was supposed to be a normal event. Thus, D
= 0 is abnormal. This is a problem to me because I just argued that the reason
why Halpern and Hitchcock’s account of actual causation struggles with prevention
scenarios is that in them the value of the effect variable is normal. But here we
have their account delivering the wrong result in a prevention scenario in which the
value of the effect variable appears to be abnormal.
Another problem to my argument is that there are, of course, cases of genuine
prevention:
Example 6. Assassin first puts a lethal dose of poison in Victim’s
coffee. Bodyguard then manages to put in antidote. Victim drinks the
coffee and survives.
With the obvious variables:
A = (1 if Assassin puts in poison, 0 if she doesn’t)
B = (1 if Bodyguard puts in antidote, 0 if she doesn’t)
VS = (1 if Victim survives, 0 if she doesn’t)
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And the equation:
VS = max((1-A), B)
The point is just that here we have a case in which an intuitively abnormal value
of a variable (B = 1) causes an intuitively normal value of a variable (VS = 1). Is
this another counterexample to my thesis ‘normal causes for normal effects’?
I shall now explain away these apparent troubles of my argument. Start from
Example 5, the village scenario. Could it be the case that the value of D = 1 is
normal after all? Well, there is a sense in which it is normal, namely in the light
of there being no floods that spring. Given that there were no floods that spring,
it was normal for the medieval buildings to remain undamaged. Introducing the
barriers along the river banks didn’t make any difference to that. In Example
2, the value of the effect variable (Victim’s surviving = 1) is normal given the
value of a cause variable (Assassin’s putting in poison = 0). Bodyguard’s putting
in antidote doesn’t change this. In Example 3, the value of the effect variable
(Victim’s remaining sober = 1) is also normal, given the value of a cause variable
(Assassin’s putting in alcohol = 0). Bodyguard’s putting in alcohol neutralizer is
again irrelevant. Note that the cause variables in the light of which the values of
the effect variables are normal are those that are temporally prior to the putative
preventers. The significance of this can be seen by considering the two remaining
scenarios.
In Example 4, the temporally prior variable corresponds to Bodyguard’s putting
in antidote (B = 1). It is only later that (Cooperative) Assassin puts in poison (C
= 1). In the light of B = 1, it is normal for Victim to survive (VS = 1). So here we
have a similar analysis as above, except that now it is the poison that doesn’t make
any difference in the state of the system. But consider now Example 6, in which
the poison is added first and the antidote afterwards. Here, in the light of the value
of the temporally first variable (A = 1), the normal value of Victim’s surviving is
0. Crucially, Bodyguard’s putting in antidote (B = 1) makes VS to take a value
that is abnormal given the value of A. In other words, given that Assassin had put
in poison, Victim’s not surviving was considered normal; but Bodyguard’s putting
in antidote made the abnormal happen and Victim survived. This is why, I submit,
Example 6 is considered as a case of genuine prevention while the others aren’t.
The pattern in these various scenarios seems to be this. In genuine preventions,
the actual value of the effect variable is abnormal given the values of the variables
temporally prior to the putative preventer. In bogus preventions, the actual value of
the effect variable is normal given the values of the variables temporally prior to the
putative preventer. One might hypothesize that the underlying psychological story
goes something like this. The values of the variables that come temporally first
serve to set the context, generating an expectation as to the normal value of the
effect variable. The causal contribution of the putative preventer is then evaluated
against this expectation. This would at least explain why, in Examples 4 and 6,
it seems to make a difference whether the antidote is served before or after the
poison. It also follows that, in a scenario in which the background story would be
just like in Example 4, but in which the poison would be administered first and
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the antidote afterwards, people would be more inclined to treat B = 1 as a cause
of VS = 1 than in Example 4.
The above fits nicely together with Tim Maudlin’s (2007) observation that spe-
cial scientists as well as ordinary speakers seek to taxonomize the world into entities
obeying quasi-Newtonian laws. We see such entities as having inertial states or in-
ertial motions; and those states or motions provide the backdrop against which we
identify causation. Maudlin himself argues that we tend to assign a causal status to
those events that disturb the inertial states or inertial motions of the entities in our
taxonomy, which is why his account is similar to the abnormality-based accounts
discussed in this paper. But that is a separate component in his overall theory.
What is is important for our purposes is the following connection: the inertial state
or inertial motion of the entity under consideration seems to determine the normal-
ity of the effect variable in our models. The value is regarded as normal if it is
what we would expect given the inertial properties of the system–and otherwise it
is abnormal.
If this is correct, then it is not surprising why in the examples discussed above
the expected or normal values of the effect variables change as explained. The
temporally prior variables suggest an inertial motion or an inertial state for the
entities–individuals and processes–that we are considering. Thus, if we know that
there is flood and the inertial motion of the flood-approaching-village system is
such that there is going to be some damage to the village’s medieval buildings,
then we expect the value of D to be ‘1’–and if it is not, we regard the value of D as
abnormal. Then again if we know that there is no flood, the way the inertial state
of our flood-approaching-village system is, the expected value of D is ‘0’. I claim
that this is how the temporally prior variables work in all of the examples discussed
above: they make us attribute an inertial state or inertial motion to the system under
consideration, and it is the outcome that is in harmony with the inertial properties
of the system that is the expected value of the effect variable in our model.
There is no question that our assumptions about the inertial properties of causal
systems could be manipulated in many other ways. I claim no unique role for
temporally prior variables, even though they seem to play this role in all of the
examples that I have discussed. It is also clear that the way in which we carve the
world into quasi-Newtonian entities is subject to many contingencies: as Maudlin
observes, a given causal scenario can be usually interpreted in terms of several
different quasi-Newtonian taxonomies. Far from being a vice, this is a virtue: it
explains why some of our causal judgments are genuinely ambiguous. Consider
again Example 4. If our causal intuitions disagree about whether Bodyguard’s
putting in antidote is an actual cause of Victim’s survival, I suggest it is because
some of us focus on the inertial state of Victim when she has ingested the antidote
(with the expected outcome VS = 1) while some of us focus on the inertial motion
of the poison propagating in Victim’s body (with the expected outcome VS = 0).
It is only with reference to the latter system that Bodyguard’s putting in antidote
(B = 1) counts as an actual cause of VS = 1. This is also where both the actual
cause and the actual effect are abnormal values of the variables in question.
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5 Conclusion
I began by presenting Halpern and Hitchcock’s sophisticated account of actual cau-
sation and demonstrated how it deals with some causal chestnuts. I then argued
against their use of the incomparability strategy in ruling out cases of bogus preven-
tion. I showed that adopting the incomparability strategy makes it easy to generate
counterexamples by altering the background story of the relevant causal scenario
and I demonstrated this by generating one such example. I then sought for an
alternative way of dealing with the problematic cases of prevention. Here, I used
Kahneman and Miller’s observation that not only causes but also their effects are
typically assumed to be abnormal events. I argued that normality-based accounts of
actual causation consequently suffer from an abnormality bias, which makes them
incapable of dealing with causal scenarios in which the value of the effect variable is
normal. I then argued that all of the problematic cases for Halpern and Hitchcock
are precisely ones in which the effect is normal. I wrapped up the discussion by
putting forward a general framework of how the normality of an effect varies in
causal scenarios, which was where I used Tim Maudlin’s observation that special
scientists as well as ordinary speakers seek to taxonomize the world into entities
obeying quasi-Newtonian laws. Using this idea, I affirmed the intuitive judgment
that in cases of genuine prevention the actual value of the effect variable is abnor-
mal, while in cases of bogus prevention the actual value of the effect variable is
normal.
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